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*Nation building and political participation in Spain and Hungary in the Late Modern Age: a comparison*1

**Abstract**

Despite being two relatively distant countries and with a diverse recent History, if we compare *grosso modo* some aspects of the History of Hungary and Spain we can find numerous coincidences which allow us to elaborate a common scheme for both. In this paper I will analyze the parallel development which the two countries experienced during the 18th and 19th century, specifically how, in Spain as in Hungary, the building of the concept of nation, the settlement of liberal systems, the political participation and their posterior crisis followed similar phases. This similitude is the demonstration of the fact that, despite the differences that at first seem decisive, similarities are more relevant, being both countries inserted in a bigger context at a European level during the Late Modern Ages.

**Keywords:** Spain, Hungary, nation building, liberal revolution, political participation, enlightenment, common history, Habsburg, nationalism

This essay has as a main goal the search and explanation of the common points and differences between two independent (at least at first sight) albeit indirectly related historical processes: the construction of the nation and the State –both of them in the liberal and contemporary meaning of the word- in the cases of Hungary and Spain during the late modern period. The time frame I choose for this work is that of the *“Long Nineteenth Century”* (1789-1914). During this analysis, we’ll pay special attention to the aspects of nationhood building (primarily from a cultural perspective) and political participation in both countries. The final objective and target of the paper is thus to demonstrate the parallelism between the two processes, showing that despite being framed in different geographical contexts, the political trajectory of Spain and Hungary throughout the 19th century belong to a global phenomenon in a higher European setting, instead of being isolated phenomena.

There have been previous studies on the comparison of the 19th century liberal Spain construction in its Western European context, such as the work of Manuel Santirso2, but they refer to the parallelism with closer countries such as France, Belgium or the United Kingdom, rather than to the similarities we could find with

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1 I started this paper when I was an Erasmus exchange student in the Institute of History of the ELTE (2012-2013), and its elaboration is the result of several reflections and lectures taken in the course *“Social History of Hungary in the 19th Century”*, imparted by Károly Halmos, with whom I had so many talks comparing the History of Hungary and that of Spain that are a big part of the origin of this work. I would also like to thank István Majoros, whose courses introduced me to the factual History of Hungary in the 19th century during my first semester in Budapest.

more distant countries, like Hungary. Some work has also been done before about the common history between Hungary and Spain such as the book *Hungria y España, relaciones milenarias*³, but its target is not exactly the same as the present essay, and focus entirely on historical relations. The development of such a rich topic could fill well a good number of volumes, but for space reasons I will try to summarize and emphasize, especially just in the processes that were coincident and identical in the political history both countries, leaving aside the obvious differences between Spain and Hungary throughout the late modern age.

**Comparison of backgrounds**

One of the biggest of these differences may be the complicated relationship between Hungary and Austria inside the Habsburg Monarchy through all the 18th and 19th centuries, a situation that finds no parallelism in the Spanish case (not even during the puppet government established by Napoleon). The relative subjugation of Hungary by Austria during the 18th and the first half of the 19th century determined decisively the shape of Hungarian liberalism and favored the national revival of Hungary and the pursue of a nation-state by the Magyars through the century. It also conditioned the economic development of Hungary, as the Habsburg relegated the Lands of the Holy Crown to the role of an economic colony that provided Austria with raw materials and in exchange imported its manufactures: an unequal system that handicapped Hungary’s industrial development for more than one hundred years⁴. As a global country, Spain didn’t suffer this kind of disadvantage, though similar realities can be found among its regions.

The second main factor that marked the decisive differences between both countries is the multiethnic nature of the historical Hungary—in 1786 just the 39% of Hungary’s population was of Magyar ethnicity⁵, something that differentiates it from the Spanish counterpart (Spain, for example, lacked the debate of a “Jewish Question” through the 19th century onwards) and that led the nationalities inside the country to an independentism that ultimately would led the Old Hungarian Kingdom (inside the Habsburg Monarchy) to a collapse, as some historians state⁶.

Related to this topic, another great historical differentiation between both countries can be made of their confessional setting since Early Modern Ages. While the Hispanic Kingdoms were progressively unified not just by politic but also by religious means, especially due to the imposition of the Inquisition and the expulsion of Jews in 1492 and the morisco⁷ population between 1609 and 1613, the historical

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⁵ Ibid. 154.
⁷ Moriscos was the name of the Muslim population remaining in the Hispanic Kingdoms after the conquest of Granada. They were expelled in the beginning of the 17th century.
Hungary had during the whole Modern Age a rich diversity of confessions and religious institutions, including Catholics, Lutherans, Jews, Calvinists, Uniates and Orthodox. This religious diversity, interrelated with the question of nationalities (certain confessions encouraged certain kinds of nationalism, and even the feeling of attachment to a foreign power, as for example happened with the Orthodox Serbians of the south of the Monarchy with Serbia), gave Hungary a kind of social issues that Spain didn't experience during the 19th century inside the Peninsula. Also, the different churches of each confession inside Hungary had a major role in the national awakening of each ethnicity, as it happened in Transylvania with the Vlach Uniates (who progressively acquired a Romanian self-awareness) under the leadership of the bishop Inocentiu Micu-Klein (1692-1768).8

Leaving aside aspects concerning ethnicity or the historical background, by far the most decisive of the divergences between the historical Hungary and Spain is, without doubt, the geographical setting of both. While Spain occupies the most part of the Iberian Peninsula and is surrounded by sea in most of its sides, the historical Hungary (and still more Hungary proper) was a landlocked country, with the only exception of the port of Fiume, incorporated in 1779 to the Kingdom by Maria Theresa9. While the Hispanic Kingdom, located in the western side of Europe, had a traditional trend for Mediterranean or Atlantic economical and even imperialist expansion (which led to the creation of a colonial empire during Early Modern Ages), Hungary remained during its history as an interior land, working as a nexus between East and West, and with fewer possibilities of ultramarine contact and innovation.

However, we shouldn’t undervalue its possibilities: Hungary always took advantage of the Danube as a main international communication and trade nexus with other European countries, something that doesn’t have a parallel in Spain, where no navigable rivers communicating the Peninsula with external spaces exist.

Comparing the Age of Enlightenment

The origins of liberal culture and nationalism development can be traced in both countries to the end of the 18th century, with the first attempts of reform „from above“ and the expansion of the Enlightenment ideas. In Spain these attempts were expressed by the proposals of reform of Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744-1811) and the desamortización (seizure of goods of the privileged strata) of Manuel Godoy in 1798. Hungary experienced this dynamic earlier with the seizure of the monasteries and nunneries of contemplative orders by the Patent of the king Joseph II of 1781 -a measure that seems to anticipate those taken in Spain during the 1830s by the liberal governments, and even before by the Napoleonic administration- that dissolved 136 of 255 monasteries in Hungary, as the study of Péter Ban states10. We can compare it with the measures taken in

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9 Ibid. 130.
10 Quoted by: BEALES, Derek: Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe. I.B. Tauris,

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Spain some decades later: in 1808 the Napoleonic government of Joseph I Bonaparte proclaimed the dissolution of two thirds of the monasteries in Spain, among other confiscations and seizures, and the year after the same government proclaimed the disbandment of all the convents and religious orders. However, the measures of the afrancesado administration were soon cut by the return of the absolutism of Ferdinand VII in 1813 and 1823.

In this process the French Revolution had an important role -serving as a model and inspiration for enlightened, liberal and even Jacobite republican societies abroad (which would have a higher importance in Hungary than in Spain, mixing the republican exigencies with the claim for more independence and social and land reforms) and both countries experienced the same reaction towards it on behalf of the ruling dynasties (the Spanish Bourbons and the Habsburg in Hungary), which were related to the French Bourbons by family ties, with the establishment of censorship against the new ideas. In Hungary the repression was intensified after the so-called „Martinovics Plot”, and in 1801 total censorship was established for journals that didn’t pass the revision of the police. In Spain the observance was the hardest in Europe (probably because of the proximity with France); in 1791 the State Secretary Count of Floridablanca (1728-1808) forbid the whole press publications, creating a cordon sanitaire towards France and watching over the French population in Spain to prevent the infiltration of revolutionary ideas into the Peninsula.

Both countries were, at the end of the Ancien Régime, in the same economic and social situation: a completely agrarian economy with almost no industrial production -excepting, in the case of Spain the early textile industries of the region of Catalonia and some dispersed manufactures in Castile- with a bad distribution of land property (which, in major part, was in the hands of latifundia of the aristocratic landowners who inherited them by the entail) and a rigid estate society in which the nobility (very abundant in both countries: nobles constituted 5% of the Spanish population in the 1787 census, and 4-5% of the Hungarian population in 1784) and the Catholic Church were sustained by their rents and were tax-exempted. In addition, the income losses produced by the fall of the American colonies and the participation in the Napoleonic Wars in the case of Spain left the economy totally exhausted.

The major part of the population had thus an agrarian occupation in both

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12 People of francophile behavior or ideas (particularly enlightened philosophy) were popularly known in Spain with the rather derogative term of afrancesado (frenchified), a word that later defined the Spanish population that supported the new régime of Joseph I Bonaparte. Thousands of them had to leave the country and restart their lives in France after Napoleon’s final defeat in the Peninsular War.
countries, with an economic output based on grain production and cattle breeding. Population has been esteemed for Hungary at the end of the 18th Century (1786) as 8.6 million inhabitants\textsuperscript{16}, while in peninsular Spain, a country larger than the historical Hungary, historians estimate 11 million inhabitants in 1787\textsuperscript{17}. In 18th century the population of Hungary and Spain, which had grown since the beginning of the century, was especially settled in the periphery with the result of a depopulated central area of the country. This depopulation of the central area was due in the case of Spain to the hard demographic and economic crisis of the 17th century (wars included), and in the case of Hungary it was caused to the long period of fighting between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, which led to the devastation and depopulation of the central plain in the 16th and 17th centuries.

In the political area, both countries had a representative organ typical from the Ancien Régime, organized by estates and without a great political effectiveness. In Hungary the Diet had been progressively ignored by the Austrian monarchs throughout the second half of the 18th century, and in Spain the Courts (Diet) of Castile fell into disuse during the century\textsuperscript{18}, while the Courts of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia were cancelled at the beginning of the 18th century by the Bourbon centralism.

We can thus see that both countries had a similar economic, social and even (in some senses) political situation during the last decades of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, an obsolete base on which the liberal state machinery would settle along the century, sometimes in a progressive and peaceful way and sometimes with violent means. Thus, throughout the first half of the 19th century, in Hungary as in Spain, two parallel phenomena were to be developed: the growth of the liberal culture (including the germs of the future party system) and the formation of a national and cultural identity adapted to the new liberal ideas.

\textit{Birth of nationalism}

As the British historian Eric Hobsbawm stated on his work about nationalism\textsuperscript{19} and José Álvarez Junco stated for the case of Spain\textsuperscript{20}, there was a previous feeling of „proto-national” identity -Hobsbawm uses the example of Russia as a paradigm\textsuperscript{21} - long time ago, but it was in the first years of the 19th century when a culture of national identity, closely related to the political liberalism (the first step for a Nation-State) was developed.

This „proto-nationalism” –that can be related with the idea of „ethnic patriotism” about which Álvarez Junco talks, but not the same concept as „ethnic

\textsuperscript{16} CARTLEDGE (2011): 154.
\textsuperscript{17} ANES, Gonzalo: \textit{El Antiguo Régimen: Los Borbones} (vol. IV), IN \textit{“Historia de Espana Alfaguara"}, directed by Miguel ARTOLA. Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1976. 27.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. 304.
\textsuperscript{20} ÁLVAREZ JUNCO, José: \textit{Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX}. Santillana, Madrid, 2001.
\textsuperscript{21} HOBSBAWM (1992): 50.
patriotism” doesn’t necessary carry to „proto-nationalism” 22 can be traced to earlier centuries, and was identified little by little, in Spain and Hungary as in other countries such as England or France, with a territory that was vertebrate around a monarchy23—in the case of Spain, the Habsburg Monarchy (the Monarquía de los Austrias) and in the case of Hungary, the Old Hungarian Kingdom of the Árpádian Dynasty- that in both countries brought together peoples of different institutions and languages under the same Crown. From the institutional point of view it is enough to think on the amount of kingdoms that formed the Spanish Monarchy (Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Valencia and the Princedom of Catalonia just in the Peninsula, each of them with their own customs and laws), or the special situation that some areas of Hungary enjoyed (such as the special status of the Székely and Saxon communities, or the degree of autonomy that Transylvania had enjoyed since the tenth century inside the Kingdom24).

In Hungary the question of language was quite meaningful, and it carried to a renaissance without precedents of the Hungarian language that started at the end of the 18th century. This happened despite the efforts of Joseph II to Germanize the administration and the resistance of other nationalities inside Hungary that preferred Latin as the official language of the Diet and of legislation inside the Kingdom, because of its value as a „neutral” tool of understanding25. However, Latin continued to be the official tongue in these areas of government until 1843 – despite its linguistic distance with Hungarian language, which made it a language suitable just for the educated-, when it was definitely replaced by Hungarian. Thus, the controversy among the non-Magyar nationalities continued as the old proto-national concept of Hungarvs started to be related just to Magyar-speakers. This was not the case of Spain, where the Castilian language replaced the usage of Latin and other vernaculars -among them, Aragonese or Catalan, in use inside the Crown of Aragon- during the 16th and the 17th centuries in the Estate bureaucracy26, enjoying an unmatched preeminence in all levels of life, especially since the instauration of a more centralist State during the Bourbon dynasty in the 18th century. However, Latin remained the language of teaching in some Spanish universities until 1813, when it was definitely replaced by Castilian27. As we can see, Latin language played at that time a rather marginal role in Spain, in comparison with its use in Hungary.

Even if the case of Spain differs to that of Hungary in the use of a national language, we can say that the renaissance of Hungarian language and culture

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23 Ibid. 63.
26 ÁLVAREZ JUNCO, José: Mater dolorosa. La idea de España en el siglo XIX. Santillana, Madrid, 2010. 79.
reminds that of the Catalan language and ethnology during the Catalan Renaixença (the Catalan „Renaissance”) since the decade of the thirties in the 19th century, when the Catalan culture started to be researched and put into value again, not necessarily from a nationalist point of view. Thus, a comparison of the Hungarian cultural rebirth could be established in terms of chronology and culture with the Renaissance of Catalan culture towards the end of the 19th century.

Turning back to the Spain-Hungary similarities, the creation of a cultural expression of nationalism and liberalism had its reflection in the literature of both countries; in the case of Hungary in the hand of playwrights and poets in the revitalized Magyar language, such as Mihály Vörösmarty (1800-1855), Ferenc Kölcsey (1790-1838), and especially Sándor Petőfi (1823-1848), very often involved in liberal politics as were José de Espronceda (1808-1842) or the journalist Mariano José de Larra (1809-1837) in Spain. The creation of the nationalist and romantic feeling was related to the creation of the first national Histories, a role played in Spain by the historian Modesto Lafuente (1806-1866). In both countries a lot of national cultural institutions were created, such as the National Museum of Hungary (1807) or the Museum of El Prado in Madrid (1819).

Reform and Revolution: the Age of Liberalism

Concurrently, a new liberal political culture was extended and little by little impregnated the Hungarian Diet with such figures as István Széchenyi (1791-1860) and Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894). This expansion of liberal culture in the representation organ was totally different in Spain, where there was no continuity with the Ancien Régime Court and where the Parliament was gathered in Cádiz in 1810 during the French invasion, for it was the French invasion and the war against Napoleon the factor that created in Spain the power-vacuum that was suitable for the formation of a Parliament with a liberal program. From this point of view, the French invasion and the event of the Peninsular War were the spring that permitted the start of the liberal development in Spain, a situation that didn’t have its counterpart in Hungary because of its lack of a French occupation. The end of the French occupation in 1813 led also in Spain to the end of the first phase of liberal rise of Spain, as well as to the end of the progressist measures of the Napoleonic puppet government of Joseph I Bonaparte, and to the return of absolutism.

Differently to Hungary, where there was no violent confrontation between the nation and the monarch until the 1848 revolution, in Spain the liberalism was settled in the system in the first half of the century with advances and recoils through revolutions and coup d’état: liberalism was eradicated by the absolutism in 1814, and it came back between 1820 and 1823 (during the so called „Liberal Triennium”), and after a second repression by the absolutism it was settled progressively (again with some recoils) in the Constitutions of 1837, 1845 and 1869.

This difference in the creation of a political liberal culture doesn’t avoid, however, finding common places between Spain and Hungary. In both countries
two main trends of liberalism were developed (with some major differences): the moderated and the more progressist one. The moderate option, represented – with abysmal differences, however, in the ideas and modus operandi – in Hungary by István Széchenyi and Ramón María Narváez (1800-1868) in Spain, searched for changes through controlled reforms, avoiding the expansion of suffrage and agreeing with the monarchy. The radical trend was represented in Hungary by Lajos Kossuth and in Spain by the general Baldomero Espartero (1793-1879), both charismatic and military figures of prestige.

During the first half of the 19th century the political nation was enlarged in Spain and the voting franchise was extended. During the Cádiz Parliament of 1810 the deputies were designed by Indirect Male Universal Suffrage (proclaimed again in the 1812 Constitution), something that would be abandoned again with the return of absolutism. The 1837 Constitution (after the definite fall of absolutism) established a censitary suffrage that extended the number of voters to the 2.2% of the Spanish population28, a number that was still more reduced to the 0.8% of the population by the electoral law of 184629. Considering these figures, we see that the representative system of the Hungarian Diet was wider than the Spanish one (among other factors, due to the large amount of nobility members) during the first half of the century, even if it was less advanced: indeed, it was wider than that of the French Parliament at that time30. The Spanish electoral laws were changed again in numerous occasions, being enlarged by the Progressists when they were ruling, and reduced by the Moderates when they substituted them, until finally the Male Universal Suffrage was established for six years after the Revolution of 1868, during the so-called „Democratic Sexennium“. In Hungary, in the other hand, the enlargement of the political nation, which was still for a long time in the hands of privileged estates, didn’t happen until 1848 in spite of the petitions of the Lower Chamber deputies such as Ferenc Kölcsey31.

It is, without any doubt, the 1848 Revolution which marked a change in the Hungarian political culture after the so called „Reform Age“. It cannot be compared to a specific Spanish event, but there are some elements in common between the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and the bourgeois liberal revolutions that took place in Spain between 1810 and 1868. The Hungarian „Twelve Points“ can be compared to a synthesis of the same exigencies that the Spanish liberals proclaimed at the same time, like a summary of the 1812 or the 1869 Constitution, due to its base liberalism. Summarizing, even if the 1848 Revolution doesn’t have its exact equivalent in the Spanish history, its values and spirit can be considered a

One of the main points of the Hungarian revolutionaries was the settlement, through the Act V of 1848, of the first enlargement of the Hungarian political nation. Every man over twenty years old, without crime charges and with a property of 300 florins or 8-20 acres of terrain obtained the right to vote. This way the 25% of the adult male population of Hungary could participate in the franchise, the 7% of the total population. This electoral law was more progressive and advanced (it comprised more population) that the franchise of Spain at that time.

During the years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the old system of landowning started to be dismantled, especially during the emancipations of 1848 and 1853 that abolished entailment (however, it survived in other forms for more decades). In Spain these measures, that put the land in free capital circulation and abolished the Ancien Régime privileges, took place already in the decade of the 1830s. Part of this project were the desamortizaciones proclaimed by the liberal ministers, which we already mentioned. The most important was that of Juan de Mendizábal (started in 1836), whose goal was to nationalize and sell the properties of the Church.

A conservative solution: „Kiegyezés” and „Restauración”

The next big period in the formation of a liberal state and political culture in Spain, after the 1868 and the turbulent age of the „Democratic Sexenium” (1868-1874), started in 1874 with the return of the Bourbon dynasty, the institution of the „turning” system and the beginning of the age known as the Restauración (Restoration). It is possible to find numerous points of coincidence with the period of Dual-Monarchy and the 1867 Compromise in Hungary.

In first place, in both countries this age represents the culmination of the liberal project and the definitive instauration of its state. Both in the age of the Compromise (in the case of Hungary) as in the age of Restoration (in the case of Spain) the creation of a political system that lasted until the end of the First World War (beginning its crisis in the first decade of the 20th century). Both political systems were born from a compromise of moderated and relatively conservative character, with a Parliament-limited monarchy, and both were promoted by a leading political and intellectual figure of liberal moderated character: in the case...
of Spain Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (1828-1897), and in the case of Hungary Ferenc Deák (1803-1876).

In both countries this period was defined by an inflexible and predetermined political structure: in Spain by the rigid turismo of the two main parties (in practice, not very different from each other); the Conservatives and the Progressists (who made turns in the government through pacts, thus managing to win always with astonishing absolute majorities, between the 82,7% of the Parliament in 1901 and the 98,2% reached in 1884²⁷), and in Hungary –where governments were appointed first and later elections were held too³⁸, as it was the case of Spain- by the permanence in power of the Liberal party (whose main leader was Kálmán Tisza), so called „the government party” because of its continuity and its composition of State bureaucrats and parliamentarians³⁹.

Both systems avoided the insertion of real political alternatives in the government, and both had a member composition based on the high society. In both the Hungarian and Spanish cases, the ruling parties were supported by a rural elite that used its influence and local power to reach their objectives: the magnates in Hungary and the caciques (local oligarchy) in Spain. The electoral system was totally corrupted in both countries –as it happened in many other countries in Europe- by the electoral fiddles and the gerrymandering that ensured the permanence of the ruling parties in the government and were an accepted part of the system.

It was in this period when the Male Universal Suffrage was adopted in 1890 (under the rule of the Progressist Party), already established briefly during the „Democratic Sexennium”. In Hungary the franchise was still strongly censitary, limited to the 6% of the Hungarian population in the Law XXXIII of 1874⁴⁰. In 1913 another electoral law was proclaimed, for which the 8,7% of the population was allowed to vote⁴¹, but at this time the franchise in Hungary was backward compared to that of the Western European countries: finally the claims for Universal Suffrage were transformed in social unrest that led to the „Red Thursday” events in 1903⁴². The law of 1913 also introduced secret ballots in some cities, which were already established in Spain since 1837.

Both systems, the political systems of the ages of Restoration and the Dualism, entered in a crisis during the first decade of the 20th century. In Spain and Hungary those were years of big social conflicts, with large harvest strikes such as the organized by the Andalusian jornaleros (day laborers) between 1902 and 1903, or the events of the Tragic Week of Barcelona of 1909⁴³.

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²⁷ FONTANA, Josep: La época del liberalismo (vol.6). Crítica and Marcial Pons, Barcelona, 2007.100
³¹ ibid.
³² CARTLEDGE (2011): 263.
³³ Between 26th July and 2nd August 1909 a series of violent confrontations took place in the city of
In 1905 a coalition of the opposition parties managed to defeat the Liberal Party of István Tisza for first time in the elections, signing the end of a political dynamic that was in course since the 1867 Compromise and starting a political turning point. In the same years the turning Spanish parties entered a crisis too and started to dismember, thus marking the end of the age of the Restoration and starting a new époque. Both systems -born from a preconceived planning between the 1860s and the 1870s- started to fall down.

In Hungary the First World War would sign the end of the Dual-Monarchy system, and after an attempt of communist revolution the authoritarian option of Miklós Horthy was established in 1920. In Spain the crisis of the Restoration system led into the settlement in 1923 of another authoritarian rule, the conservative dictatorship of the general Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870-1930), a character of similar views to those of Admiral Horthy, which lasted until 1930. With the rise of authoritarian rule the Golden Age of liberalism ended in both countries.

**Conclusion**

As it was analyzed in this brief dissertation, in spite of the obvious differences between Spain and Hungary, it’s possible to locate numerous coincidences in the historic development of the Liberal state and nationhood in the two cases. Both countries started in similar social and economic conditions, typical from the Ancien Régime, constructed their identity and developed a liberal and reformist ideology throughout the last decades of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century together with a nation culture with marked romantic character. Both countries experienced decisive liberal revolutions in the middle of the century that were to led to the settlement of the Liberal Nation-State in the context of a parliamentary monarchy, with experiments that were not always definitely successful, such as the Independence of 1848 or the Democratic Sexennium.

Along the last third of the 19th century, however, a new political system was adopted and maintained, in both countries a rigid and conservative structure, monarchic and parliamentary, with a high influence of the local oligarchies and which relied in preconceived voting results. This system would last until the first decades of the 20th century, when it entered in a crisis that made the hegemonic parties lose the control of the government and made them divide, giving place to political alternatives. The institutional weakness resulting from the crisis of the system, intensified by the situation of Europe after the First World War, led to the rise of the conservative authoritarian rule of two military characters in the

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Barcelona when the reserve troops who were going to be embarked towards Morocco rioted in the port of the city. The reason of this unrest had a social cause: the reserve troops had humble origins, while the sons of bourgeois families didn’t have to go to the colonial wars as they paid an exemption. The rebellion triggered a whole week of agitations through the city that ended with a hard military repression.
twenties, Miklós Horthy and Miguel Primo de Rivera, who presented themselves as the saviors of their countries’ stability.

Despite the distance and in spite of what National Historiography asserted since 19th century -with a great influence on what nowadays is still found in the consciousness of peoples 44, such as myths or preconceived ideas of self-peculiarity- in these pages we have seen, through the parallel evolution of both countries’ politics, that Hungary and Spain followed a similar pattern of development of their liberal systems and of their political progress. This pattern represents the logical evolution of two countries shaped inside a bigger European context, and it shows us that we have to look at historical processes as a part of a larger background. This is still valuable nowadays; when contemporary phenomena like globalization and the opening of borders is making us be more similar between ourselves as the times goes by.